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SITTING IN CONGRESS AND STANDING IN
COURT: HOW PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS OPEN THE DOOR TO
LEGISLATOR LAWSUITS
Abstract: Federal courts have struggled to establish a consistent doctrine
regarding when legislators have standing to sue in their official capacity.
Presidential signing statements add a new element to this often unclear
area of law. This Note argues that signing statements do not reach the
level of vote nullification, the only injury that the Supreme Court has
held sufficient for legislator standing. Despite this, signing statements can
potentially injure legislators in a concrete and particularized manner suf-
ficient for standing. When the President asserts the right to deny legisla-
tors information to which they are statutorily entitled, and follows
through with that assertion, legislators who desire to challenge that action
in federal court should be granted standing.
INTRODUCTION
On _July 26, 2006, Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill into the
U.S. Senate that proposes granting legislators standing to challenge the
legality of presidential signing statements) This bill was the product of
a growing concern that President George W. Bush was abusing the
practice of issuing signing statements. 2 In introducing the bill, Senator
Specter emphasized that although the use of signing statements has
been commonplace in our nation's history, the President cannot be
permitted to use this device to rewrite the laws that Congress passes. 3
Senator Specter and others claimed that signing statements were be-
coming a method by which the President could circumvent the consti-
Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006). This
bill also instructs state and federal courts to afford no weight to signing statements when
interpreting federal statutes. Id. § 4.
2 See 152 CoNG. REC. 58271 (daily ed. July 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter) (not-
ing that "President Bush has used signing statements in ways that have raised some eye-
brows"); see also infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text-
s 152 CONG. Rec. 58271 (statement of Sen. Specter) ('"The President cannot use a
signing statement to rewrite the words of a statute nor can the President use a signing
statement to selectively nullify those provisions he does not like. This much is clear from
our Constitution.").
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tutional procedures for enacting legislation and that th4 bill was neces-
sary to safeguard those constitutional procedures. 4
Although the practice of issuing signing statements has been con-
troversial in its own right, 5 Senator Specter's proposal raises unique
questions about when federal legislators have standing to sue the ex-
ecutive branch for injuries to their lawmaking power. 6 In determining
whether a party has standing, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed par-
ticular emphasis on the nature of the injury that is suffered.? Although
the Court has held that the nullification of a specific vote is sufficient
for legislators to have standing, it is not clear whether presidential sign-
ing statements could ever amount to nullification. 8 Furthermore, ques-
tions remain about whether any injuries other than vote nullification
are sufficient to give legislators stancling. 8 The answers to these ques-
tions depend heavily on the principle of separation of powers and an
understanding of the proper role of the federal courts under Article III
of the Constitution. 18
4 See id. ("If the President is permitted to rewrite the bills that Congress passes and
cherry pick which provisions he likes and does not like, he subvert,s the constitutional
process designed by our Framers."); Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) thereinafter Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing
Statements] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the judiciary)
(stating that the use of signing statements "poses a grave threat to our constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances").
5 See infra notes 173-199 and accompanying text.
° See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding that a group of federal legisla-
tors lacked standing to challenge executive branch action); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 446 (1939) (holding that a group of state legislators had standing to challenge action
taken by the state's lieutenant governor); see also Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B.
Lotrionte, Congress Coes to Court: The Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARv.
J.L. & Pun. Pot.'v 209, 213 (2001) (arguing that legislators suing in their official capacity
should never be granted standing); R. Lawrence Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue:
Whose Vote. Is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAsne. L. REV. 1, 26 (1986) (arguing that individual
legislators should not be granted standing to sue for official injuries to their lawmaking
powers, but Congress as a whole could qualify for standing); Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of
Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as Counterweight?, 54 U. Prrr. L; REV. 63, 70 (1992)
(arguing that legislators should be granted standing when they bring claims that funda-
mentally concern the constitutional allocation of powers between the executive branch
and Congress); James I. Alexander, Note and Comment, No Place to Stand: Tire Supreme
Court's Refusal to Address the Merits of Congressional Members' Line-Item Veto Challenge in Raines
v. Byrd, 6,1.L. & POE:). 653, 698 (1998) (arguing that diminution of legislative power
should qualify as a sufficient injury to give legislators standing in the federal courts).
7 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
6 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 823; Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446.
9 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 823 (holding that vote nullification could give legislators stand-
ing, but not foreclosing the possibility dint other injuries might be sufficient).
10 See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 (stating that the judicial power shall extend to "cases"
and "controversies"); Raines, 521 U.S. at 819-20 (stating that the standing inquiry is espe-
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This Note analyzes the issue of granting legislators standing to
challenge presidential signing statements. 11 It argues that, although
generally a challenge to presidential signing statements is not sufficient
to give legislators standing, 12 in some circumstances the use of this de-
vice can cause concrete and particularized injury to legislators suffi-
cient to confer standing. 13 Part I discusses the doctrine of standing, par-
ticularly the U.S. Supreme Court's articulation of how standing relates
to the doctrine of the separation of powers." Part II explores the his-
tory of legislator stancling. 15 Specifically, it analyzes the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's various approaches to this
issue and also the Supreme Court's treatment of legislator claims. 16 Part
III presents the topic of presidential signing statements and discusses
the controversy surrounding President George W. Bush's use of this
device. 17 Part IV argues that, although in most circumstances legislators
do not have standing to sue the President over signing statements,
when the President uses signing statements to deprive legislators of in-
formation to which they are entitled, they suffer a concrete and par-
ticularized injury adequate for stancling. 18
1. THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING: How THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
RESTRICTS ACCESS TO TIIE FEDERAL COURTS
Standing is the determination of whether a particular litigant has a
sufficient personal stake in a controversy to entitle him or her to judi-
cial resolution of that controversy. 19 The doctrine is rooted in Article
cially rigorous when reaching the merits of a dispute would force the court to decide
Whether action taken by one of the other two branches of the federal government was
unconstitutional). In Lupin, the Court stated that Article Ill was aimed at limiting the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts to disputes involving the rights of individuals, and not vin-
dicating the public interest. 504 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137,170 (1803)).
See infra notes 223-313 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 227-283 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 284-313 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 51-160 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 51-160 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 161-222 and accompanying text.
18 See info notes '223-313 and accompanyhig text.
19 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,731-32 (1972); sre also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490,498 (1975) (describing standing as the question of whether a litigant is entitled 10
have the court decide the merits of a dispute); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962)
(describing standing as the question of whether the appellants alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of a controversy to assure that issues arc presented with concrete
adverseness); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
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111, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which limits the juris-
diction of the federal courts to actual "cases" and "controversies." 2° The
federal courts have developed several justiciability doctrines to aid in
determining which disputes are proper for adjudication. 21 Of these jus-
ticiability doctrines, standing has been called the most important be-
cause it essentially determines who can bring a suit in federal court. 22
The doctrine has also proven to he one of the most criticized and in-
consistent in all of constitutional law."
A. The Requirements of Standing
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed three irreducible constitu-
tional elements that must be satisfied for a plaintiff to be granted stand-
ing.24 First, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact." Second,
that injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlaw-
ful conduct.26 Third, a favorable decision must be likely to redress the
injury. 27
The Court has elaborated considerably on the requirement that a
plaintiff demonstrate an injury in fact. 28 To satisfy this requirement, a
plaintiff must show an invasion of a legally protected interest that is
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 882 (1983) (describing standing as the answer to the
question, "What's it to you?").
20 U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2, ci. 1; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
21 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. "Justiciability" is a term employed to describe the limita-
tions that the "case" and "controversy" requirements of Article III place upon the federal
courts. Flast V. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). The justiciability doctrines that have arisen
to restrict the federal courts to their appropriate role include the prohibition against advi-
sory opinions, the political question doctrine, mootness, ripeness, and standing. See
Vander Jagt v. O'Neil, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring); see
also Floss, 392 U.S. at 95.
22 See Allen, 968 U.S. at 750.
21 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am& United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("We need not mince words when we say that the concept of 'Art.
III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases
decided by this Court ...."); ERWIN CIIEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND Poucies 60 (2d ed. 2002) ("Standing frequently has been identified by both justices
and commentators as one of the most confused areas of the law."); LAURENCE 14. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L. 390 (3d ed. 2000) ("[Tjhe law of standing has for some
time been one of the most criticized aspects of constitutional law.").
21 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
25 Id. at 560; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
26 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Allen, 468 U.S, at 751.
27 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
25 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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concrete and particularized, and actual or hnminent. 29
 The Court has
rigorously enforced this requirement and has routinely dismissed cases
where a plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an injury of this sort. 3 °
In addition to constitutional standing requirements, the Court has
embraced several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction. 31 The Court specifically has identified several of these
"prudential" requirements that are not rooted in Article Ill and there-
fore can be overcome by congressional statute.32 First, a plaintiff gener-
ally may assert only his or her own legal rights and cannot raise the
claims of third parties." Second, a plaintiff must raise a claim within
the "zone of interests" protected by the law invoked. 34
A third requirement that prohibits plaintiffs from asserting gener-
alized grievances was once thought to be a prudential requirement, but
the Court has more recently indicated that it is part of the constitu-
29 Id. The Court has held that Congress can create legally protected interests by stat-
ute. See Worth, 422 U.S. at 514 ("Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the
alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would
have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute."); Trafficante
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White,]., concurring) (stating that in the
absence of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, plaintiffs would not have had standing to bring
their case, but that the statute conferred standing upon them). But see Lujan, 504 U.S, at
573 (holding that the injury-in-Fact requirement was not satisfied by "congressional confer-
ral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the
Executive observe the procedures required by law").
5° See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (holding that plaintiffs had not demonstrated an actual or
imminent injury where the alleged harm was a decreased likelihood of viewing endan-
gered species at sonic undetermined future time); Allen, 468 U.S. at 754-56 (holding that
plaintiffs who alleged harm based on the IRS granting tax-exempt status to racially dis-
criminatory schools did not demonstrate a particularized injury because they were not
personally denied equal treatment); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)
(holding that a plaintiff, despite being subject to a "chokehold" by Los Angeles police
officers in the past, did not demonstrate actual or imminent injury in a suit seeking to
enjoin the city from using "chokeholds" in the future).
31 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
52 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 63; see Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Mirth, 422 U.S. at 499.
35 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Worth, 422 U.S. at 499.
55 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Ass'It of Data Processing Seri/. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 155-56 (1970) (holding that data processing companies were within the zone of in-
terests protected by a statute that barred bank service corporations from "engaging in any
activity other than the performance of bank services for banks"). The "zone of interests"
requirement primarily has been applied to administrative law cases when the plaintiff is
not directly regulated by the administrative agency at issue. CIIEMERINSKY, supra note 23,
at 101. In these circumstances, the Court has required that the plaintiffs demonstrate that
they are within the zone of interests protected by the statute in question to qualify for
standing. See Gimp, 397 U.S. at 153.
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tional standing inquiry." In 1968, in Flast v. Cohen, the Court held that a
taxpayer challenge to federal expenditures, which the taxpayer alleges
to be a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
satisfies the requirements of standing. 36 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court explicitly stated that Article III is not an absolute bar to federal
taxpayer suits. 37 Eight years later, in Warth v. Seldin, the Court con-
firmed that the prohibition against generalized grievances is a pruden-
tial requirement apart from the constitutional minimum required for
stan di ng. 38
Despite these indications that the prohibition on generalized griev-
ances is a prudential limitation on standing, the Court, in 1992 in Lujan
u Defenders of Wildlife, held that the Constitution mandates this prohibi-
tion." At issue in Lujan were provisions of the Endangered Species Act
of 1973 (the "Act") that purported to grant any citizen the right to sue
the government for not acting in compliance with the Act. 4° Despite this
language in the statute, the Court held that plaintiffs' assertion of a
generalized grievance does not confer standing upon them.'" Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that Congress cannot convert
the public interest in proper administration of the laws into a private
right sufficient for Article 111 standing by simply passing a statute. 42 After
Lujan, therefore, the bar against hearing generalized grievances is best
understood as a constitutional requirement for standing. 43
B. Using Standing to Protect the Separation of Powers
The U.S. Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence regarding stand-
ing for generalized grievances reflects a broader shift in its understand-
ing of the relationship between standing and the doctrine of the sepa-
" Compare Rag, 392 U.S. at 101 ("[Wie find no absolute bar in Article III to suits by
federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending pro-
grams."), with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 ("We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising
only a generally available grievance about government ... does nut state an Article III case
or controversy.").
" 392 U.S. at 105-06.
37 Id. at 101.
39 See 422 U.S. at 499 (describing the bar against generalized grievances as being apart
from the minimum constitutional mandate).
39 See 504 U.S. at 573-74.
40 Id. at 571-72.
11 See id. at 573-74.
42 Id. at 576-77.
43 See id. at 573-74; see also Scalia, supra note 19, at 886 (stating that Congress's ability
to convert generalized benefits into legal rights is limited by the core constitutional stand-
ing requirements).
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ration of powers." Early interpretations of the doctrine of standing
were concerned primarily with whether the dispute before a court pre-
sented concrete adverseness and a form capable of judicial resolution."
The Court's more recent decisions, however, describe standing as fo-
cused on limiting the federal courts to their proper role in a democ-
ratic society."
In Lujan, the Court relied specifically on separation of powers
concerns in holding that Congress cannot convert generalized griev-
ances into individual rights cognizable for standing. 47 Generalized
grievances, the Court reasoned, involve vindicating the public interest,
a function of the legislative and executive branches." Only when a case
presents injury to an individual right is the judicial branch best suited
to resolve the matter." Respect for the roles of the coordinate branches
44 See. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 387-88 (describing how in recent years the Court has
dramatically altered the focus of the standing inquiry to include separation or powers con-
cerns); Scalia, supra note 19, at 897-98 (stating that although separation or powers con-
cerns had all but been eliminated from the standing inquiry, recent cases "explicitly ac-
knowledge that standing and separation of powers are intimately related"). Compaie Flag,
392 U.S. at 100 (`"The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain
the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems .. .."), with
Worth, 422 U.S. at 498 ("[Standing] is founded in concern about the proper—and prop-
erly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society."), and Allen, 468 U.S. at 752
("Mlle law of Art III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of
powers.").
45 See Flint, 392 U.S. at 101; Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
46 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77; Allen, 468 U.S. at 752; Valley Forge, 459 U.S. at 472.
47 504 U.S. at 576-77.
48 Id. at 576.
49 See id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,170 (1803)); see also Arend
& Lotrionte, supra note 6, at 280-81 ("[CJourts, as the only non-elected Branch of govern-
ment, would be overstepping their role if they were to engage in a review of the intra- and
intet,Branch disputes unless somehow such disputes affected rights of private individuals.");
Scalia, supra note 19, at 894-95 ("Unless the plaintiff can show some respect in which he is
harmed more than the rest of us ... he has not established any basis for concern that the ma-
jority is suppressing or ignoring the rights of a minority that wants protection, and thus has
not established the prerequisite for judicial intervention."). For differing views on standing
and separation of powers generally, see Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke,
Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52
(1985) (arguing that there are collective rights for which standing should he allowed); Gene
R. Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) (ar-
guing that the doctrine of standing is ill-suited to serving separation of powers goals and
should instead remain a threshold question used only to measure a litigant's stake in a case);
Roberti. Pushaw, justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL
L. REv. 393 (1996) (arguing that historic evidence of Federalist theory indicates that the use
of justiciability doctrines to avoid hearing cases, rather than judicial review, poses a greater
risk to the separation of powers); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? (if Citizen
Suits, Injuries, and Article HI, 91 Mimi. L REV. 163 (1992) (arguing that the "citizen suits"
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has also led the Court to state that the standing inquiry is especially
rigorous when hearing a case would require a court to decide whether
an action taken by one of the political branches is unconstitutional."
H. FROM COLEMAN V. MILLER TO RAINES V. BYRD: THE HISTORY OF
LEGISLATOR STANDING
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue of legislator
standing in two contexts: legislator suits based on an injury to an indi-
vidual interest, 51 and suits based on an injury to an institutional inter-
est. 52 Injury to an individual interest requires personal harm to a legis-
lator,55 whereas injury to an institutional interest involves harm to a leg-
islator's official lawmaking power." Although the Court has granted
standing to legislators asserting an individual injury, 55 a challenge to
presidential signing statements could only constitute an institutional
injury because signing statements are by definition a response to legis-
lators exercising their official lawmaking power.55 The remainder of
this Note thus examines a legislator's standing in the context of an in-
stitutional injury. 57
This Part explores the Supreme Court's and lower courts' treat-
ment of standing where legislator plaintiffs allege an institutional in-
jury. 58 This history demonstrates that even though the federal courts
rejected by the Court in Lujan are not inconsistent with Article III standing, despite the fact
that the injury is often to a majority interest).
5° Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding that a group of U.S. Representa-
tives did not have standing to sue executive branch officials over the use of the Line Item
Veto).
51 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-18 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116,
131 (1966).
52 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438
(1939).
53 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 493 (Congressman denied his seat in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives and deprived of his salary).
54 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 816 (dilution of legislative power); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438
(vote nullification).
55 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 493, 516-18 (holding that a U.S. Representative who had been
denied his seat in the House of Representatives and deprived of his salary presented a
justiciable case); Bond, 385 U.S. at 118, 131 (holding that the Court had jurisdiction to
review the case of a plaintiff who had been elected to, but was nonetheless excluded from,
the Georgia House of Representatives).
56 For a discussion of signing statements, see infra notes 161-222 and accompanying
text.
57 Cf. Raines, 521 U.S. at 817 (members of Congress claimed a dilution of their legisla-
tive power); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436 (Kansas state legislators claimed that their votes had
been nullified).
58 See infra notes 60-160 and accompanying text.
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have settled on a doctrine of legislator standing that follows the tradi-
tional standing inquiry (requiring injury to a legally protected interest,
causation, and reciressability), demonstrating concrete and particular-
ized injury is a difficult hurdle for legislator plaintiffs.59
A. Coleman v. Miller: The U.S. Supreme Court
Recognizes Legislator Standing
The earliest U.S. Supreme Court decision to address the issue of
legislator standing for an institutional injury is the 1939 case of Coleman
v. Mille& In Coleman, the Court granted standing to a group of state
legislators from Kansas who challenged the procedures employed in
ratifying an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 6 ' After a vote on the
amendment in the state senate was split, the lieutenant governor cast
the deciding vote in favor of the amendment. 62 A group, of legislators
(including all twenty state senators who voted against the amendment)
challenged the propriety of this action, claiming an injury to their
power as legislators. 65 The injury at issue, the Court explained, was that
these legislators' votes had been "overridden" and "virtually held for
naught."64 The Court concluded that these legislators had an interest in
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes and that the alleged injury
to that interest was therefore sufficient for standing purposes. 65
A separate opinion that justice Frankfurter authored strongly criti-
cized the Court's decision to grant standing to these legislators. 66 Jus-
tice Frankfurter first explained that the injury suffered by plaintiffs not
among the twenty senators who voted against ratification was no differ-
ent from that of any other citizen. 67 Unlike the twenty senators who
voted against ratification, these other senators had not seen their votes
"held for naught" and therefore presented only a generalized grievance
39 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (explaining that the
Constitution requires plaintiffs to show injury, causation, and redressability to have stand-
ing in federal court); Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that the traditional standing tests applied to noncongressional plaintiffs apply to
members of Congress as well); we also Raines, 521 U.S. at 818-19, 830 (applying the tradi-
tional standing test to members of Congress but holding that dilution of voting power is
not an injury sufficient for standing).
60 307 U.S. at 437.
61 Id. at 436-37.
62 Td. at 436.
63
 Id. at 436, 438.
64 Id. at 438.
65 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438. 446.
66 Id. at 460 (Frankfurter; J.).
67 Id. at 467.
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insufficient for standing. 68 As for the former group, Justice Frankfurter
stated that the procedures for voting in legislative assemblies are the
essence of political action and therefore cannot constitute private dam-
age sufficient for standing. 69
Coleman remains the only case in which the Court has held that leg-
islators have standing to sue based on an institutional injury. 70 Although
it therefore represents an important precedent, it leaves undecided
many issues regarding the circumstances in which legislator standing is
permissible." For one, Coleman involved state legislators and may not
raise the same concerns about separation of powers that are involved in
a suit brought by federal legislators. 72 Furthermore, the Kansas Supreme
Court in Coleman had already treated the senators' interest in their votes
as a basis for entertaining the suit. 73 Granting standing in this circum-
stance, where a state court has already determined that plaintiffs have a
sufficient interest, could be distinguished from a suit by federal legisla-
tors where a federal court would make the determination about
whether federal legislators' interest is sufficient for standing." Finally, all
twenty senators who had allegedly been disenfranchised were parties in
the suit. 75 Whether the participation of all the disenfranchised senators
was an essential element in granting standing is another question left
unanswered. 76 Although Coleman established that legislators can have
standing, it left later decisions to develop the specific contours of this
doctrine."
63 Id.; el id. at 438 (majority opinion) (granting standing to legislators whose votes had
been "overridden and virtually held for naught.').
69 Id. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J.).
7° See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446; see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 830 (holding that legislative
plaintiffs lacked standing).
71 See Arend & Lotrionte, .supra note 6, at 220 (arguing that Coleman raised more ques-
tions than it answered).
72 See. Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8 (acknowledging, but not deciding, that Coleman may
be distinguishable from a case involving federal legislators on these grounds).
73 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446.
74 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8 (citing Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446) (acknowledging, but
not deciding, that Coleman may he distinguishable on these grounds).
75 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
76 See Arend & Lotrionte, .supra note 6, at 221.
77 See generally Raines, 521 U.S. 811; Riegle, 656 F.2d 873; Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d
430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2c1 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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B. The D.C. Circuit's Evolving Approaches to Legislator Standing
During the 1970s and 1980s, numerous suits brought by federal
legislators against the executive branch came before the D.C. Circuit."
With only minimal guidance from the Supreme Court's decision in
Coleman, the D.C. Circuit began to develop its own approaches to the
problem of legislator standing." During the years between Coleman and
the Supreme Court's revisitation of the issue in Raines v. Byrd in 1997,80
the D.C. Circuit developed three distinct approaches to the doctrine of
legislator standing.t"
The first approach granted standing to legislators if a declaration
by the courts as to the legality of executive branch action would "bear
upon" the duties of members of Congress to take legislative action.82
The second approach applied a more stringent test for legislator stand-
ing, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that their votes had been nulli-
fied and requiring that no legislative remedies remain at their disposal."
The third approach abandoned the requirement that all legislative
remedies be exhausted and instead called on the courts, after address-
ing standing, to exercise their "equitable discretion" in determining
whether legislator claims should be heard."
1. The First Approach: Mitchell v. Laird and the "Bears Upon" Test
The D.C. Circuit's first approach to legislator standing was articu-
lated in 1973 in Mitchell v. Laird, where the court held that members of
Congress had standing." That case involved a suit that members of
Congress brought against executive branch officials for allegedly wag-
ing an unconstitutional war in Southeast Asia." The court held that
where a judicial declaration that executive branch action is unconstitu-
tional would bear upon the duties of the plaintiffs to take legislative
action (whether it be impeachment, withholding of appropriations, or
some other response), standing is appropriate. 87 This so-called "bears
78 See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 874; Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432; Mitchell, 488 F.2(1 at 613.
79 See Riegle, 656 F.2(1 at 878; Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 434, 436; Mitchell, 488 F.2(1 at 614.
X521 U.S. at 814.
81 See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878; Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 434, 436; Mitchell, 988 F.2d. at 614.
82 See Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 614.
83 See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (1).C. Cir, 1979), vacated and remanded on
other 1,77 -rinds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 936.
" See Riegle, 656 F.2(1 at 878.
85 488 F.2d at 614.
86 Id. at 613.
87 Id, at 614.
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upon" test represented an exceptionally permissive approach to legisla-
tor standing and was widely criticized by other circuit courts. 88 Not sur-
prisingly, the D.C. Circuit soon rejected this approach itself. 89
2. The Second Approach: Kennedy v. Sampson and Vote Nullification
The D.C. Circuit's second approach to legislator standing appeared
in 1974 in Kennedy v. Sampson. 99 In Kennedy, the court granted standing
to Senator Edward Kennedy to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional
pocket veto91 of the Family Practice of Medicine Act. 92 In deciding the
case, the D.C. Circuit refused to rely on the "bears upon" test articulated
in Mitchell, but instead emphasized the fact that the pocket veto
amounted to a nullification of Senator Kennedy's vote.93 In addition,
unlike the Coleman decision, the court in Kennedy explicitly staled that an
individual legislator can be granted standing with or without the concur-
rence of his fellow legislators."
Three years later, the D.C. Circuit confirmed that vote nullification
had replaced the "bears upon" test as the standard required for legisla-
tor standing in Harrington v. Bush. 95 In Harrington, Congressman Mi-
chael Harrington filed suit seeking a declaration that certain activities of
the Central Intelligence Agency (the "CIA") were illegal and an injunc-
88 See Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975) (refusing to follow
the "bears upon" test articulated by the D.C. Circuit in Mitchell and instead following the
approach of the Second Circuit in Holtzman u Schlesinger to find that plaintiffs did not have
standing); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that Con-
gresswoman Holtzman did not have standing to sue for a declaration of illegality of execu-
tive action, and rejecting the notion that a declaration would affect her performance of
legislative duties).
99 See Harrington v. Rush, 553 F.2d 190, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denying standing to leg-
islator plaintiffs and explicitly rejecting the "bears upon" test articulated in Mitchell as be-
ing inconsistent with the standing doctrine developed by the Supreme Court); Kennedy,
511 F.2d at 436 (holding that legislator plaintiff had standing but declining to rest its deci-
sion on Mitchell or the "bears upon" test).
9° See 511 F.2d at 434, 436.
91 The term "pocket veto" refers to the situation described in Article I, Section 7,
Clause 2 of the Constitution where the President does not sign a bill presented by Con-
gress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Ordinarily, a bill presented to the President becomes law
if it is not signed or returned to Congress within ten days. Id. If, however, the adjournment
of Congress within the ten-day period prevents the President from returning a bill, the bill
does not become law. Id. The controversy in Kennedy arose because although Congress had
adjourned for the Christmas holiday, the Senate had authorized the Secretary of the Sen-
ate to receive messages from the President during the adjournment. 511 F,2c1 at 432.
92 Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432-33.
93 Id. at 436.
94 Id. at 435.
95 553 F.2d at 209, 211.
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tion to prevent the CIA from improperly utilizing special Funding and
reporting provisions under federal law. 96 In holding that the plaintiff
lacked standing, the court emphasized that the alleged post-enactment
illegality had not nullified Congressman Harrington's votes a7 Specifi-
cally, the court stated that once a bill becomes law, any injury that results
from its improper implementation falls equally on all citizens and thus
constitutes a generalized grievances
The D.C. Circuit's 1979 decision in Goldwater v. Carter further re-
fined this second approach to legislator standing. 99 In Goldwater, the
court confirmed that for an injury to legislators to be cognizable for
standing, it must amount to disenfranchisement, which the court de-
fined as "a complete nullification or withdrawal of voting opportu-
nity."h" The court distinguished this type of injury from the harm re-
sulting from the Executive's mere violation of a statute enacted
through a legislator's vote because the legislator still has power to act
through the legislative process to remedy the alleged abuses.'m Accord-
ing to the court, for executive action to amount to disenfranchisement
it must completely deprive the legislators of any legislative remedy.m 2
The D.C. Circuit's second approach to legislator standing, estab-
lished in Kennedy and further refilled by Harrington and Goldwater; also
soon came under criticism.'" In an influential article, Judge Carl
McGowan, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, criticized what he saw as
contradictions in his court's approach to legislator standing. 194 On the
one hand, the D.C. Circuit had stated in Harlington that there were no
special standards for determining legislator standing. 105 But on the
other hand, the court in Goldwater held that legislator plaintiffs must
suffer an injury that his or her colleagues cannot redress through the
legislative process)° 6 Because no similar requirement existed for private
" Id. at 193.
97 Id. at 213.
" Id. at 213-14.
99 617 F.2d at 703 (holding that a group of Senators had standing to sue President
Carter over his unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with China, based on
the fact he had deprived them of their alleged constitutional right to vote on the termina-
tion).
°° Id. at 702.
Ica Id .
102 Id.
10 See Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 254
(1981).
104 Id.
195 553 F.2d at 204; McGowan, supra note 103, at 254.
196 617 F.2d at 702; McGowan, supra note 103, at 254.
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plaintiffs, Judge McGowan argued that the court's doctrine of legislator
standing was contradictory and should be revised. 107 His suggestions
were soon realized as the D.C. Circuit abandoned its second approach
to legislator standing and adopted what Judge McGowan called a "doc-
trine of equitable discretion." 108
3. The Third Approach: Riegle u Federal Open Market Committee and the
Doctrine of Equitable Discretion
The D.C. Circuit first adopted the "doctrine of equitable discre-
tion" in the 1981 case of Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee.m9 At is-
sue in Riegle was Senator Donald Riegle's challenge to the procedures
that the Federal Reserve Act of 1976 established for appointing mem-
bers to the Federal Open Market Committee."° Bothered by the con-
tradictions that Judge McGowan had highlighted, the court in Riegle
declared that it would first apply the traditional standing test— requir-
ing injury to a legally protected interest, causation, and redressability-
to legislative plaintiffs. 111 It would then examine whether any additional
considerations arising by virtue of the plaintiffs status as a legislator
counseled against adjudicating the dispute." 2 According to the court,
the doctrine of equitable discretion prohibits courts from hearing a
legislator's claim when there are other means available to the legislator
to seek redress from his or her colleagues and there is the potential
that a private plaintiff could bring a similar suit.'" Applying this new
two-pronged test, the court held that Senator Riegle satisfied the tradi-
tional requirements for standing 114 but then invoked the doctrine of
equitable discretion to dismiss his claim."5
In reaching its conclusion in Riegle, the D.C. Circuit suggested that
standing is not the doctrine best suited to deal with the separation of
powers concerns arising in claims brought by legislators against the ex-
ecutive branch." 6 Instead, according to the court, the doctrine of equi-
table discretion addressed separation of powers concerns more appro-
1 °7 McGowan, supra note 103, at 262.
1 °8 Id.; see Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878,881.
1 °9 Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878,881.
11° Id. at 874.
111 Id. at 877-78; see McGowan, supra note 103, at 254.
112 Riegle, 656 F: 2r1 at 878; see McGowan, supra note 103, at 262.
113 Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
114 Id. at 878-79.
115 Id. at 878-79,881-82.
116 Id. at 880 (q uoting McGowan, supra note 103, at 256).
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priately. 117 Later, however, several members of the D.C. Circuit criti-
cized the suggestion that separation of powers concerns were not em-
bodied in the doctrine of standing. 118
In two subsequent cases that followed the Riegle framework, 119
Judge Robert Bork and then-judge Antonin Scalia wrote separately to
express their beliefs that this approach reflects a misunderstanding of
the doctrine of standing. 12° In the 1983 case of Vander Jae v. O'Neil,
judge Bork stressed that recent Supreme Court cases had read "separa-
tion-of-powers concepts back into that part of the standing requirement
which rests on a constitutional, rather than a prudential, foundation." 121
One year later, in Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, Judge Scalia ar-
gued that separation of powers concerns are not left to the discretion of
judges but rather are embodied in Article 111. 122 Taking this argument
one step further, he argued that the Federal courts are constitutionally
barred From granting standing to any legislator who asserts an institu-
tional injury125---a conclusion Judge Bork soon reached himself. 124
Despite these concerns, the D.C. Circuit continued to use the doc-
trine of equitable discretion in deciding legislator standing until the
Supreme Court reexamined the issue. 125
117 Id. at 881.
118 See Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956-57 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Vander Jagt v. O'Neil, 699 F.2d 1106, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork,
J., concurring).
119 MOOte, 733 F.2d at 956-57; %lacier Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1179. In Moore, eighteen members
of Congress challenged the constitutionality of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982. 733 F.2d at 948 (majority opinion). The court held that the plaintiffs had stand-
ing, but exercised its equitable discretion to dismiss the case. Id. In Vander Jagt, fourteen
Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives stied the Democratic leadership
for allegedly providing them with fewer seats on House committees than they were propor-
tionately owed. 699 F.2d at 1166 (majority opinion). The court, exercising its equitable
discretion, dismissed the complaint based on separation of powers concerns. Id. at 1167.
120 Moore, 733 F.2d at 956-57 (Scalia, J., concurring); Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1179
(Bork, J., concurring).
Vander jagt, 699 E2d at 1179 (Bork, J., concurring) (citing Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ants. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
122 Moore, 733 F.2d. at 956-57 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 959.
124 Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as
moot, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (arguing that the court should renounce outright legislator
standing).
125 See generally Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (exercising equitable
discretion to hold that a suit brought by a Senator and members of the House of Repre-
sentatives challenging the constitutionality of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 should be
dismissed); Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (exercising
equitable discretion to hold that a suit brought by Senator John Melcher challenging the
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C. Raines v. Byrd: The U.S. Supreme Court Revisits Legislator Standing
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd held that a
group of legislators lacked standing to sue executive branch officials
who were responsible for executing the provisions of the Line Item
Veto Act (the "Act"), 128 The Act provided that the President could can-
cel from appropriations bills any amount of discretionary spending or
limited tax benefits provided that such cancellation reduces the federal
budget deficit, does not impair any essential government finictions,
and does not harm the national interest. 127 The President was required
to report any such "line item veto" to Congress within five calendar
days.' 28 The Act also explicitly declared that any member of Congress
adversely affected by the Act could bring an action in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. 129 The members of Congress who
challenged the law argued that the Act was an unconstitutional delega-
tion of power that would make their future votes on appropriations
bills less effective.'"
In holding that the legislators challenging the Act did not have
standing, the Court focused on the nature of the alleged injury."' In
particular, the Court explained that the injury was not personal in
nature but rather was an injury to official power. 182 Furthermore, the
Court attempted to distinguish the legislators' situation from the facts
in Coleman. 1" Writing for the majority, Chief justice Rehnquist stated
that the Court's holding in Coleman stood, at most, for "the proposi-
tion that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat
(or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legisla-
tive action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground
that their votes have been completely nullified."'" The plaintiffs in
Raines had not alleged any vote nullification but, only that their future
procedures for selecting members of the Federal Open Market Committee should be dis-
missed).
125
	 521 U.S. at 830.
1 " Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 2, 110 Stat. 1200, 1200-11, in-
validated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
128 Id.
129 Id. § 3(a).
130
 Raines, 521 U.S. at 816.
191 See id. at 821.
192 Id. (noting that the claimed injury runs with the member's seat, which he or she
holds as a trustee for his or her constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power).
133 Id. at 823-24.
194 Id. at 823.
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votes would be less effective due to the provisions of the Act. 135 Ac-
cording to the Court, unlike vote nullification, this injury is "wholly
abstract and widely dispersed." 136 The Court also explained that grant-
ing standing would be inconsistent with historical precedent and cited
past disputes between the legislative and executive branches in which
the federal courts were not involved. 137
In addition to the holding that the legislator plaintiffs lacked
standing, several other aspects of the Raines decision are notable."8
First, the Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing despite spe-
cific language in the Act purporting to grant standing to any member
of Congress that the Act adversely affected. 139 The Court acknowledged
that although this might remove any prudential barriers to standing, it
could not erase the Article III standing requirements and therefore
could not convert a generalized grievance into an injury sufficient for
standing. 140
Other portions of the Raines decision are more notable for what
they do not decide."' For example, the Court stated that it attached
some importance to the fact that the respective houses of Congress had
not authorized the plaintiff's to bring their suit." 2 The majority also
noted that its decision does not foreclose a constitutional challenge to
the Act by someone who has suffered a judicially cognizable injury.' 43
In fact, the Act was later successfully challenged in 1998 in Clinton v.
City of New York, where the Court held it unconstitutional.'" These
statements suggest that these factors played a role in the Court's deci-
sion and that, had these circumstances been different, the Court might
have granted standing." 5
•
m Raines, 521 U.S. at 825.
136 Id. at 829.
137 Id. at 826-28.
138 See id. at 829.
139 Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104130, § 3,110 Stat. 1200,1211, invali-
dated 11 Clinton v. City of New N'Ork, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Raines, 521 U.S. at 815-16.
140 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3; see also !Adam 504 U.S. at 576-77 (explaining that
Congress cannot convert a generalized grievance into injury sufficient for standing);
Scalia, supra note 19, at 886 (stating that core constitutional standing requirements limit
Congress's ability to convert generalized benefits into legal rights).
141 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824,1.8,829.
"2 Id. at 829.
L45 Id.
144 524 U.S. at 421.
HO See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. Even if the entire Congress had brought this suit, the in-
jury alleged would still fall short of vote nullification and therefore would be insufficient
for standing. See id. at 823. For this reason, the Court's statement that the plaintiff's' suit
had not been authorized by their respective houses is probably best read as an additional
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Some language in Raines, on the other hand, suggests that the
Court might never consider a claim by federal legislators sufficient for
standing. 146 In a footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that
the facts in Coleman might be distinguishable from Raines on grounds
other than the lack of vote nullification, although he refused to decide
as much. 147 First, in Coleman, the Kansas Supreme Court had already
treated the senators' interest in their votes as a basis for entertaining
the federal question before the case came into the federal courts)"
Second, Coleman involved state legislators and therefore arguably did
not raise the same separation of powers concerns that would be at issue
in a suit by federal legislators."9 The fact that the Court acknowledged
these differences, albeit in a footnote and while refusing to decide on
them, raises questions about whether federal legislators can ever have
standing to sue for an institutional injury. 15°
Not surprisingly, because the Court's decision in Raines is open to
various interpretations, it has been the subject of much criticism and
clebate. 31 Some authors have argued that reading Raines as requiring
reason why standing was inappropriate. See id.; see also Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 412
(Gth Cir. 2001) (holding that even though legislators alleged an injury of vote nullification,
they lacked standing because they did not constitute a group whose votes would have been
sufficient to defeat the legislation they alleged was improperly passed). The existence of
private plaintiffs, however, would not be an additional reason to deny standing, and is
therefore probably best read to suggest that legislator standing might be appropriate
where there is no potential private plaintiff. See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 6, at 260-61
(noting that the Court's statement about the existence of private litigants emphasized the
narrowness of the Raines decision). But see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) rfhe assumption that if [plaintiffs] have no standing to
sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing." (citing United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974))); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 ("[T]he absence of any
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the
subject matter is committed ... ultimately to the political process.").
146 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8.
147 Id.
148 Id. (citing Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446).
149 Id. But see id. at 843 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("While I recognize the differences be-
tween state and federal legislators, I do not believe that those differences would be deter-
minative here ....").
ISO See id. at 824 n.8 (majority opinion); see also Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 6, at 257
(arguing that the Court in RailieS refused to decide the issue of whether federal legislators
could ever have standing for institutional injuries).
191 See Alexander, supra note 6, at 698 (arguing that the Raines Court should have rec-
ognized diminution of legislative power as an injury sufficient for standing). See generally
Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 6 (arguing that, after Raines, separation of powers concerns
bar federal legislators front ever having standing to sue for an institutional injury); Note,
Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L.
Rtiv. 1741 (1999) [hereinafter Standing in the Way] (acknowledging that Raines restricts
legislators' access to the federal courts, but arguing that this actually will serve to weaken
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legislators to assert a personal—as opposed to official—injury is an un-
sustainable interpretation. 152 Such a standard, they contend, is inconsis-
tent with the Court's traditional interpretation of the "personal injury"
requirement for standing. 153 Furthermore, such a standard is inconsis-
tent with the Court's holding in Coleman and the Court's refusal to
overrule that case indicates that Raines cannot be understood as bar-
ring standing whenever the alleged injury is to an official interest. 154
Attempts to distinguish the holding in Raines from Coleman on
the grounds that the former involved federal legislators have also
been criticized) 55 Although the majority in Raines suggested in a
footnote that Coleman might raise less serious separation of powers
concerns because it involved state legislators, 156 Justice Breyer argued
in his dissenting opinion that this distinction is not convincing.' 57 In
any event, the Court's refusal to rely on the distinction between fed-
rather titan strengthen the separation of powers); David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of
Legislative Standing, 54 STAN: L. Rev. 205 (2001) (arguing that the Raines decision is harm-
ful to the separation of powers and that it reflects underlying problems with the doctrine
of standing).
152 See Standing in the Way, supra note 151, at 1746-47; The Supreme Court. 1996 Term—
Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 222 n.47 (1997) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
155 See, e.g., Standing in the Way, supra note 151, at 1747 ("Commentators ... agree that
'Wile allowance of sun in an official capacity is commonplace in American jurispru-
dence.'" (quoting Tttt RE, supra note 23, § 3-20, at 152 n.53)); see also Leading Cases, supra
note 152, at 222 n.47 (noting that prior to Raines, "the Court primarily had employed the
personal injury requirement to ensure that the alleged injury was particularized, and not
to distinguish between personal- and official-capacity injuries").
154 See Standing in the Way, supra note 151, at 1746 n.38 (noting that this interpretation
is in tension with Coleman because that case involved official-capacity injury); Leading Cases,
supra note 152, at 222 (stating that such a requirement is facially incompatible with Cole-
man).
' 55 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 843 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the distinction be-
tween state and federal legislators is not convincing); Leading Cases, supra note 152, at 224
n.55 (noting that if Coleman is distinguishable on these grounds, the Court's failure to
decide as much would represent a misapplication of the rule against deciding constitu-
tional questions if a case can be decided on other grounds (citing Ashwander v. Tenn,
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))).
156 Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 11.8 (acknowledging, though not deciding, that. Coleman is
distinguishable on the grounds that it concerned state legislators and therefore similar
separation of powers concerns were not present).
157 Id. at 843 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("While I recognize the existence of potential dif-
ferences between state and federal legislators, I do not believe that those differences would
be determinative here given the Constitution's somewhat comparable concerns for
state authority ... ."),
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eral and state legislators indicates that it was not distinguishing Cole-
man on these grown:6. 158
Although the Court's decision in Raines did not decide explicitly
when, if ever, federal legislators have standing, courts and commenta-
tors have presented a variety of possibilities. 159 What qualifies as vote
nullification, and whether any other injury can be sufficient, are im-
portant questions that remain unanswered and are particularly rele-
vant in evaluating how presidential signing statements fit into the doc-
trine of legislator standing, 10
III. PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE CALL FOR A
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Presidential signing statements have gained notoriety recently due
to their frequent use by President George W. Bush.' 61 Signing state-
ments are pronouncements issued by a President at the time a congres-
sional enactment is signed. 162 They serve a variety of functions that
range from merely explaining the President's reasons for signing a bill
into law to expressing the President's concern over particular parts of
155 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8 (stating that because Coleman could be distinguished
on the grounds that it involved complete nullification, it was not necessary to decide
whether it could be distinguished in other ways).
159 Id. at 824-26; see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3c1 19, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Arend &
Lotrionte, supra note 6, at 277-81 (arguing that separation of powers concerns bar federal
legislators from ever having standing to sue for an institutional injury). In Campbell, the
D.C. Circuit held that vote nullification sufficient to give legislators standing applies in
only those rare situations like Coleman where no legislative remedies exist. Campbell, 243
F.3d at 22-23, The court explained that Coleman was a unique case of vote nullification
because once the amendment at issue was deemed ratified, there was nothing that the
Kansas legislature could have done to reverse that position. Id. But see id. at 32 (Randolph,
J., concurring) (arguing that the possibility of a future legislative remedy has no bearing
on whether a vote has been nullified and stating that Itlo say that your vote was not nulli-
fied because you can vote for other legislation in the future is like saying you did not lose
yesterday's battle because you can fight again tomorrow"); Chenoweth r Clinton, 181 F.3d
112, 116-.47 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that the level of nullification at issue in Kennedy could
survive the Court's holding in Raines).
t"' See Meyer, supra note 6, at 123 (arguing that a President's refusal to enforce the law is
tantamount to nullification and that legislators should be granted standing in these circum-
stances); Exploring International Law, http://explore.georgetown.edu/blogs/?id=117451
(July 25, 2006, 16:14 EST) (arguing that a President's complete disregard for a statute might
qualify as vote nullification).
151 Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws,. President Cites Powers of His Office,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al; Editorial, Veto? Who Needs a Veto?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2006, at A22; Editorial, A White House Power Grab, S.F. CHRON., June 12, 2006, at 116.
162 Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential
Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL &run. Q. 515, 516 (2005).
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the legislation. 163 Signing statements have been particularly controver-
sial when they have been used to provide the President's interpretation
of the law, to announce constitutional limits on the implementation of
some of its provisions, or to instruct executive branch officials on how
to administer the law in an acceptable manner.'"
This Part explains some of the controversy surrounding signing
statements. 165 It begins by looking at the origins of the practice and its
increased use in recent years.'" It next examines President Bush's pro-
lific use of signing statements and the constitutional concerns that they
raise. 167 It then presents some of the responses to the President's use of
signing statements, including calls to challenge the legality of such
statements.' Finally, this Part concludes by exploring some of the
unique questions about legislator standing that arise in the context of
presidential signing statements. 169
A. The History' of the Presidential Use of Signing Statements
The signing statement is not the creation of the Bush administra-
don; in fact, the practice has been used since at least the time of Presi-
dent James Monroe.m Numerous Presidents since Monroe have issued
signing statements to identify their disagreements with Congress but
overall the practice had been used sparingly until recent presiden-
cies.'" Furthermore, Presidents generally have not gone so far as to
denounce provisions in the bills they have signed.t 72
P1ilL1,11 , 1 COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE & ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE
DIRECT ACTION 201 (2002); .NEn. KastxopF, SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE PRESIDENT'S
AUTHORITY '1'0 REFUSE TO ENFORCE THE LAW 2 (20011), http://www.acslaworg/files/
KinkopfSigning%20Statements%20and%20President's%20Anthority.pdf.
169
	 supra note 163, at 201; Cooper, supra note 162, at 517.
151 See infra notes 170-222 and accompanying text.
ISO See infra notes 170-181 and accompanying text_
167 See infra notes 182-199 and accompanying text.
168 See infra notes 200-215 mid accompanying text.
169 See infra notes 216-222 and accompanying text.
"0 AM. BAR ASSN, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPA-
RATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 7 (2006) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at http://www.
abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba final_signingstatements_recommendation-report 7-
24-06.pdf (describing how President Monroe. after signing it bill that prescribed the method
by which the President should select military officers, issued a statement that the President
alone bore the constitutional responsibility for appointing military officers).
171 See id. at 7-10 (describing the occasional use of signing statements by fourteen dif-
ferent Presidents prior to the Reagan administration).
172 Id. at 7 (describing how Presidents used signing statements to identify their differ-
ences with the Congress throughout the nineteenth century, but noting that "Presidents
seemed to shy away from statements denouncing provisions in bills they signed"); Cum-
760	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 48:739
The more frequent and controversial use of signing statements
began with the Ronald Reagan administration.'" President Reagan is-
sued seventy-one signing statements during his eight years in ofiIce..174
Under the direction of Attorney General Edwin Meese Ill, the Reagan
administration issued signing statements designed to provide the Presi-
dent's interpretation of particular statutes and to express any constitu-
tional concerns.'" More importantly, the signing statements instructed
agency heads to execute statutes in manners consistent with the Consti-
tution and therefore not to enforce provisions the President inter-
preted to be unconstitutional.'" The administrations of George H.W.
Bush and Bill Clinton continued President Reagan's approach to sign-
ing statements and used them with increased frequency, Bush issuing
146 in his four years in office and Clinton issuing 105 during his two
terms. 177
This more recent approach to the use of signing statements is par-
ticularly controversial because it allows the President to avoid vetoing a
law that he or she believes is unconstitutional.'" By simply declaring
that a portion of the law is unconstitutional and instructing agencies
not to execute it, the President exercises a kind of "line-item veto." 179
The exercise of a line-item veto raises separation of powers concerns
because it involves legislative action that is not subject to the constitu-
tional requirements of bicameralism and presentment) 8° For this very
reason, the Supreme Court declared the Line Item Veto Act of 1996
unconstitutional in 1998 in Clinton v. City of New Yok. 181
TOI'HER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL. DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL' LAWS: REVIVING THE
ROYAL PREROGA•IVE 76-80 (1998) (counting only twelve signing statements prior to 1981
in which a President expressed his intention to disregard a StRDIte).
173 ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 10; COOPER, supra note 163, at 201; Cooper, supra
note 162, at 517.
174 ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 11.
175 COOPER, supra note 163, at 202; Cooper, supra note 162, at 517.
176 COOPER, supra note 163, at 202; Cooper, supra note 162, at 517.
177 Christopher S. Kelley, Professor, Miami Univ., A Comparative Look at the Constitu-
tional Signing Statement: The Case of Bush and Clinton, Paper Presented at the 61st An-
nual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 18 (Apr. 3-6,2003), available at
at p://mpstki ndiana.edu/con12003papers/1031858822.pdf.
176 See CouPER, supra note 163, at 203-06; Cooper, supra note 162, at 517.
179 COOPER, supra note 163, at 203-06; Cooper, supra note 162, at 517.
180 See U.S CONST. art. I, § 7, el. 2; see also ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 18. Bicam-
eralism refers to the requirement that both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives
pass a bill before it becomes law. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Presentment refers to the
additional requirement that before becoming law, all bills must be presented to, and
signed by, the President. See id.
181 524 U.S. 417,421 (1998); see also ABA REPORT, SUpra 110IC 170, at 18.
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B. The Use of Signing Statements lry George W Bush
President Bush's use of signing statements has generated criticism
due both to the frequency with which he has used them and to the
broad claims of presidential authority he has made through them.' 82
President Bush issued 108 signing statements containing 505 separate
constitutional challenges in his first term 183 and, as of May 2006, he has
challenged over 750 statutory provisions in al1. 184 Furthermore, Presi-
dent Bush has used signing statements to challenge numerous congres-
sional acts without actually vetoing any laws.' 85 By not employing his
veto power, the President does not risk the possibility of a congressional
override but'still prevents provisions of those laws from going into of
 through the use of signing statements. 188
President Bush's use of signing statements has also gained atten-
tion due to the wide array of legislation he has challenged. 187 Through
signing statements, President Bush has claimed the authority to ignore
numerous provisions of bills such as requirements that the executive
branch report to Congress on the use of Patriot Act authority,' 88 whistle-
blower protections for nuclear regulatory officials,' 89 and affirmative
182 Cooper, supra note 162, at 521; Savage, supra note 161.
1" Cooper, supra note 162, at 521.
164 Savage, supra note 161.
183 Id. President Bush has since vetoed his first piece of legislation, the Stem Cell Re-
search Enhancement Act of 2005. 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1365 (July l9, 2006), avail-
able at littp://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v42no29.html.
186 See COOPER, supra note 163, at 223; see also Semite Hearing on Presidential Signing State-
ments. supra note 4 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (accusing the President of using signing statements "as a de facto line-item veto
to cherry-pick which laws he will enforce").
187 See ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 15-16; Savage, supra note 161.
1" Compare USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, §§ 106A, 119, 120 Stat. 192, 200-02, 219-21 (2006) (requiring the Inspector Gen-
eral of the Department of Justice to conduct audits on the Department's use of Patriot Act
provisions and report the results of these audits to Congress), with Statement on Signing
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42 WEEKLY Comp.
PRES. Doc. 425 (Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Patriot Act Signing Statement] ("The executive
branch shall construe the provisions of FIR 3199 that call for furnishing information to
entities outside the executive branch, such as sections 106A and 119, in a manner consis-
tent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch
and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, na-
tional security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Ex-
ecutive's constitutional duties.").
189 Compare Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 629, 119 Stat. 594, 785
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(a) (2) (West Stipp. 2006)) (providing whistle-
blower protection for contractors and subcontractors or the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion and Department of Energy), with Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doe. 1267 (Aug. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Energy Policy Act Signing
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action provisions.' 90 The signing statement that has generated perhaps
the most attention was issued in response to the McCain Amendment,
which forbids U.S. officials from using cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment on prisoners.' 91 The McCain Amendment,' 92 also known as
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, mandates that detainees not be
subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 193 In response to
this clear directive, President Bush issued a signing statement asserting:
The executive branch shall construe [the McCain Amend-
ment], relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the uni-
tary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consis-
tent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power,
which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Con-
gress and the President, evidenced in [the McCain Amend-
ment], of protecting the American people from further ter-
rorist attacks.' 94
Statement] ("The executive branch shall construe the amendments to section 211 of the
Energy Reorganization Act made by section 629 of the Act, as they relate to dissemination
of official information by employees of the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to
supervise the unitary executive branch.").
19° Compare Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-189,
§ 7(b), 116 Stat. 698, 700 (codified as amended at 12 U.S,C. § 635(b) (1) (E) (iii) (II) (Stipp.
III 2003)) (requiring an emphasis on conducting outreach and increasing loans to socially
and economically disadvantaged small business concerns, and small business concerns
owned by women), with Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization
Act of 2002, I Pun. PAPERS 989 (June 14, 2002) [hereinafter Export-Import Bank Reau-
thorization Act Signing Statement] ("The executive branch shall carry out section 7(b) of
the bill, which relates to certain small businesses, in a manner consistent with the require-
ments of equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.").
191 Joint Statement, Sen. John W. Warner, Chairman, S. Armed Service Comm., and Sen.
John McCain, Presidential Signing Statement on Detainee Provisions (Jan. 4, 2006), http://
warner.senate.gov/pressoffice/statements/20060104.htm; Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass
New Thrture Ban: Waiver Right Is Reserved, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006, at Al; Editorial, Un-
checked Abuse, WASH. POST, jall, 11, 2006, at A20.
192 The law was passed as part of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemen-
tal Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified in scattered sections of 42
193 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003(a), 119 Stat. 2680,
2739 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (West 2001 & Supp. 2006)).
194 Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Ap-
propriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of
2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Emergency Sup-
plemental Appropriations Act Signing Statement].
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The broad language of this statement suggests that the President can
ignore the provisions of the McCain Amendment because they impinge
on his constitutional authority as head of the "unitary executive branch"
and as the Commander-in-Chief, and furthermore, that his actions in
this area are outside the scope of judicial review. 195
Aside from purporting to ignore major provisions of various laws,
President Bush's signing statements have also been criticized for adopt-
ing broad interpretations of executive power.'" Two of the most com-
monly used objections in the President's signing statements—that provi-
sions of a law interfere with his power to supervise the unitary executive
branch or interfere with his exclusive power over foreign affairs 197—are
far from widely accepted legal views on executive power.'" Further-
more, refusing to enforce provisions of a law because they conflict with
the President's own broad views of executive power is a use of signing
statements not employed by previous Presidents. 199
195 See id,
196 Cooper, .supra note 162, at 521.
197
 Id. at 522.
195 See Harndi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935). Several Supreme Court cases upholding the constitutionality
or independent agencies and independent executive officials cast doubt on the theory of a
unitary executive. See Hurnphrg's F,x'r, 295 U.S. at 628-29 (upholding restrictions on the
President's power to remove federal trade commissioners because the agency exercised
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authority); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-
93 (1988) (upholding restrictions on the President's power to remove the Independent
Counsel because these restrictions did not interfere with the President's ability to fulfill his
or her constitutional duties). For criticism of the theory of a unitary executive branch
generally, see Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61
U. Ctn. L. REV. 123 (1994) (arguing that we must accept some congressional efforts at
regulating presidential lawmaking); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 Cortukt. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that historical evidence indicates
that the Framers did not intend to create a clear executive hierarchy with the President at
the top). Recent Supreme Court decisions have also cast into doubt the theory of exclusive
executive power in foreign affairs. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773-74
(2006) (noting that the Constitution vests the powers over war in both the President and
Congress); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (stating that a state of war is not a "blank check" for the
President).
199 See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Abner J.
Mikva, Counsel to the President (Nov. 2, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
nonexcuthtm (arguing that a President is obligated to enforce a statutory provision, re-
gardless of his own personal beliefs as to its constitutionality, if he believes that the Su-
preme Court would sustain that particular provision as constitutional).
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C. The Response to George W Bush's Use of Signing Statements
President Bush's prolific use of signing statements has drawn con-
gressional attention and calls for action. 200 Shortly after newspaper re-
ports detailed the President's use of this device,201 legislation was intro-
duced into the U.S. House of Representatives calling for various re-
sponses.202 The U.S. Senate Committee on the judiciary also conducted
hearings on the issue, 208 and the American Bar Association (the "ABA")
convened a task force to issue recommendations. 204 Both the ABA Task
Force and individuals testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee
called upon Congress to enact legislation granting itself standing to sue
the President over signing statements. 205
Although much of the focus on President Bush's use of signing
statements has been critical of the device, many have also voiced sup-
port for the use of signing statements in appropriate circumstances. 206
A group of legal scholars (all of whom have served in the Office of Le-
gal Counsel) responded to the ABA's recommendations by arguing that
signing statements are sometimes necessary and even a positive tool for
maintaining checks and balances in government. 207 These scholars
point out that the President has a duty to uphold the Constitution, and
therefore if a law passed by Congress violates the Constitution, the
President has a duty not to enforce it. 208 Furthermore, they argue,
when the President refuses to enforce a law, signing statements inform
Congress and the public of that decision and thereby make the Presi-
dent's execution of the laws more transparent. 2D8 Some have also ar-
200 ABA REPORT, ROM note 170, at 24-26; Charlie Savage, Hearing Vowed on Bush's Pow-
ers; Senator Questions Bypassing of Laws, BosTotst GLOBE, May 3, 2006, at Al.
201 Savage, supra note 161.
202 II.R. 5486, 10901 Cong. § 1 (2006) (proposing to cut off all funding for the produc-
tion, publication, and dissemination of signing statements, and directing federal agencies
not to consider signing statements when determining how to implement a law); 1-1.R .J. Res.
89, 109111 Cong. § 1(a) (2006) (proposing to require the President to report to Congress
any time he or she makes the determination not to enforce a particular provision of law).
208 Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4.
204 ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 3.
20 Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (testimony of Bruce
Fein and Professor Charles Ogletree); ABA REPORT, supra note 170, al 25.
2°6 Posting of David Barron et al. to ACSblog, lutp://www.acsblog.org/cat-separation-
of-powers.html ( July 31, 2006, 15:38 EST).
2°7 Id. Although the authors of this posting write in support of signing statements in
some circumstances, they are also critical of George W. Bush's use of the device. Id. They
believe the real concern is the broad claims of authority that the Bush administration has
made, and that the ABA's focus on signing statements misses this bigger concern. Id.
2°8 Id,
409 Id.
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gued that because they express the President's interpretation of a law,
signing statements are the equivalent of legislative history and should
be given the same weight by courts when interpreting statutes. 21 °
Despite some support for signing statements, Senator Arlen Spec-
ter, acting on the advice of the ABA Task Force, introduced a bill into
the U.S. Senate on July 26, 2006 purporting to grant standing to mem-
bers of Congress to challenge signing statements. 211 The goal of this
legislation is to allow a congressional lawsuit against the President to be
heard in federal court where the President can be ordered to enforce a
statute that he has thus far refused to enforce. 212
 Potentially, one U.S.
Supreme Court decision could put to rest the issue of the constitution-
ality of signing statements. 213 Therefore, instead of seeking to challenge
each of President Bush's signing statements, congressional members
may hope to obtain one ruling from the Court that affirms their posi-
tion. 214 Whatever the arguments as to the merits of such a suit, the pro-
210
 SeeABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 10 (noting that Ronald Reagan's Attorney General
Edwin Meese arranged to have signing statements published along with legislative history in
the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News). At least two current Su-
preme Court Justices have also suggested that signing statements are worthy of the same in-
terpretive weight as legislative history. See Harridan, 126 S. Ct. at 2816 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that the majority neglected to include the President's signing statement in its
discussion of the legislative history of a statute); Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to The Litigation Strategy Working
Group 1 (Feb. 5, 1986), http://wwwarchives.gov/news/sanmel-alito/accession-060-89—
269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf (presenting a strategy to en-
sure that presidential signing statements are given equal consideration in interpreting legisla-
tion). For a discussion of the appropriate level of deference presidential signing statements
should receive generally, see Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements,
120 Hmtv. L. REv. 597 (2006) (arguing that "[c]ourts should adopt a flexible approach to the
amount of deference accorded signing statements by applying doctrinal tools developed in
the areas of statutory interpretation and administrative law").
211 Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006). Sec-
tion 5, entitled, "Congressional Standing to Obtain Declaratory Judgment," states:
Any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading by
the United States Senate, through the Office of Senate Legal Counsel,
and/or the United States House of Representatives, through the Office of the
General Counsel for the United States House of Representatives, may declare
the legality of any presidential signing statement, whether or not further re-
lief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Id.
212 Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (testimony of Bruce
Fein).
219 ABA REpoRT, supra note 170, at 26.
214 Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (statement of Sen. Pat-
rick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (arguing that President Bush's
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posal raises serious questions about whether signing statements suffi-
ciently injure federal legislators to qualify them for Article III standing
in the federal courts. 215
D. The Unique Problems Posed by Challenging Signing Slaiements
Legislators hoping to challenge the legality of presidential sign-
ing statements would have to overcome several major obstacles, one
of the most difficult being to demonstrate an injury sufficient for
standing.216 Signing statements present unique questions. about stand-
use of signing statements to "cherry-pick" which laws he will enforce is unconstitutional);
ABA REPORT, supra note 170, at 26.
215 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997); Lilian v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 576-77 (1992); Coleman s Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).
216 Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (testimony of Professor
Nicholas Rosenkranz) (stating that standing doctrine is notoriously complicated, and that
Congress's ability to confer standing on itself is a vexed question); id. (testimony of Profes-
sor Christopher Yon) (stating that in his opinion Congress lacks constitutional authority to
statutorily confer standing on itself to challenge presidential signing statements).
Any challenge that legislators bring will also have to satisfy other justiciability require-
ments; in particular, it must be shown that the case is ripe for judicial resolution and that it
does not present a political question. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49
(1967) (stating that "it is fair to say that [the] basic rationale [of ripeness] is to prevent the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in ab-
stract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects
felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties"); Baker v. Garr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
(listing six criteria for determining whether a case presents a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion). For a challenge to a signing statement to be ripe for judicial resolution, the Presi-
dent must have actually followed through with the expressed intentions in the signing
statement. See Abbott, 387 U.S. at 148-49; see also C1JEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 102 (ex-
plaining that the ripeness doctrine seeks to exclude from judicial review claims based on
an injury that is speculative and may never actually occur); TRIBE, supra note 23, at 390
(stating that ripeness is frequently an issue in preenforeement challenges where there is
some doubt as to whether the law in question will actually he applied to die plaintiffs). For
example, if Congress chooses to challenge the President's signing statement issued in re-
sponse to the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, it would pose a seri-
ous ripeness problem. See Patriot Act Signing- Statement, supra note 188. A challenge to the
President's declaration that he has the authority to withhold information from Congress
does not present an issue that is ripe. See Abbott, 387 U.S. at 148-49. If, however, the Presi-
dent goes beyond simply claiming this authority and actually does withhold information
from Congress, then the case would he ripe for judicial resolution. See id. When discussing
challenges to signing statements in the remainder of this Note, it is assumed that the
President has actually acted on or followed through with the expressed intent in a signing
statement, thus ensuring that a challenge is ripe for judicial resolution. See id.
In addition to being ripe, a challenge to signing statements must not embody the
characteristics of a political question to avoid being dismissed as nonjusticiable. See Baker,
369 U.S. at 217 (listing the following criteria as indicative of a political question: "[1] a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
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ing not addressed in previous cases of legislator suits against the ex-
ecutive branch. 2 " Most. important among these is whether a signing
statement can ever amount to the nullification of a legislator's vote. 218
On the one hand, signing statements look very much like the
pocket veto that the D.C. Circuit in 1974 recognized as vote nullifica-
tion in Kennedy v. Sampson. 219 The practical effect of each device is simi-
lar—preventing a bill from becoming law (in the case of a pocket veto)
or preventing a law from being enforced (in the case of a signing
statement). 22° On the other hand, a challenge to signing statements
very much resembles a claim that the President is not complying with
the law. 221 This type of injury has consistently been held insufficient to
give legislators standing to sue the President. 222
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or [31 the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question"). Most challenges to signing statements
would not arise in a context where the Court has held that the political question doctrine
restricts access to the federal courts. See DIEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 130 (noting that
the Court has considered the political question doctrine in the areas of the Republican
Form of Government Clause and the electoral process, foreign affairs, Congress's ability to
regulate its internal processes, the process for ratifying constitutional amendments, in-
stances where the federal courts cannot shape effective equitable relief, and the impeach-
ment process). Challenges to signing statements involving foreign policy questions would
be the most likely to be dismissed on political question grounds. See id.
217 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 814-16; Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438.
218 See Exploring International Law, http://explore.georgetown.edu/blogs/?id=17051
( July 25, 2004, 16:14 EST) (arguing that a President's complete disregard for a statute
might qualify as vote nullification). Compare Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 211 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (holding that nullification had not occurred where there was no claim that votes
were denied full force and effect), with Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 434, 436 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (holding nullification occurred where a "pocket veto" rendered a legislator's
vote meaningless).
219 511 F.2d at 432, 436.
22° See id. at 432; Cooper, supra note 162, at 517 (comparing signing statements to a
line item veto).
221 Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (statement of Sen. Pat-
rick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("President Bush has employed
signing statements to ignore or disobey more than 750 laws.").
222 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J„ concurring)
(stating that serious separation of powers concerns are raised by the argument that "[wle,
the members of Congress, have standing because the President violated one of our laws");
Harrington, 553 F.2d at 213-14 (stating that "since the impact of illegality is shared by all
citizens, appellant's complaint about the administration of the CIA Act becomes a 'gener-
alized grievance about the conduct of government' which lacks the specificity to support a
claim of standing" (quoting Ham v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968))).
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IV. LEGISLATOR STANDING TO CHALLENGE SIGNING STATEMENTS:
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES
This Part argues that although presidential signing statements do
not rise to the level of vote nullification, they can still result in an insti-
tutional injury sufficient to give legislators standing. 223 The first Section
explains why even those signing statements that express the President's
intent to disobey a law do not amount to the nullification of legislators'
votes. 224 The next Section explains that absent vote nullification, most
challenges to signing statements present a generalized grievance and
therefore the doctrine of separation of powers bars legislators from hav-
ing standing. 225 The final Section argues that legislators should be eli-
gible for standing even absent nullification when executive branch ac-
tion deprives them of information to which they are statutorily end-
ded.226
A. Signing Statements Do Not Amount to Vote Nullification
The U.S. Supreme Court has not articulated a precise definition of
vote nullification. 227 In particular, it is unclear to what extent the D.C.
Circuit's interpretation of vote nullification survived the Supreme
Court's 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd.228 Regardless of this uncertainty,
signing statements do not meet the standard of vote nullification articu-
223 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (denying standing where legislators'
votes had not been nullified); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(holding that legislators do not have standing when they assert only a generalized griev-
ance about the conduct of government (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) )).
224 See infra notes 227-254 and accompanying text.
225 See infra notes 255-283 and accompanying text.
226 See infra notes 284-313 and accompanying text.
227 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
228 See 521 U.S. at 823 (stating that "legislators whose votes would have .been sufficient
to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action
goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been com-
pletely nullified"). Following the Raines decision, the D.C. Circuit wrestled with the ques-
tion of whether Kennedy v. Sampson, which held that the President's pocket veto was tanta-
mount to vote nullification, was still good law. Compare Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (implying that the holding in Kennedy does not survive the Raines decision
because future legislative action was a remedy available to Senator Kennedy in challenging
President Nixon's pocket veto), with id. at 32 (Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing that
Kennedy is still good law after Raines), and Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116-17
(1).C. Cir. 1999) (stating that the Kennedy holding could survive the Court's articulation of
vote nullification in Raines).
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fated in any of the cases in which a court has held that nullification oc-
curred. 229
There are important differences between presidential signing
statements and other executive branch action that has been found to
amount to vote nullification. 230 Most importantly, a refusal to enforce
or comply with a law (as expressed in a signing statement) does not
prevent that law from going into effect. 231 Unlike the facts at issue be-
fore the D.C. Circuit in the 1974 case of Kennedy u Sampson, where
President Nixon's use of the "pocket veto" was designed to prevent a
bill from becoming law, signing statements arc issued while the Presi-
dent simultaneously signs a bill into law. 232 President Bush's signing
statement accompanying the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reau-
thorization Act, for example, did not prevent that bill from becoming
law but rather expressed only the President's belief that he is not re-
quired to comply with it fully. 233 Therefore, unlike the cases in which
the courts have found that vote nullification has occurred, signing
statements do not deny legislators the opportunity to vote or cause
their votes to go uncounted. 234
This distinction is important because it goes directly to the issue of
whether legislators have been permitted to fulfill their constitutionally
mandated role.255 When legislators' votes are ignored or uncounted, it
diminishes, or even abolishes, their constitutional power to make
229 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939); Coldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697,
703 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Kennedy v.
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
25° See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436 (illegal tie-breaking vote cast by lieutenant governor);
Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 701 (President's unilateral termination of a treaty); Kennedy, 511 F.2d
at 432 (President's use of an illegal "pocket veto").
251 Cooper, supra note 162, at 516 (noting that signing statements are issued when a
President signs a bill into law).
252 See 511 F.2d at 432; Cooper, supra note 162, at 516.
255 See Patriot Act Signing Statement, supra note 188.
23-4 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (holding that state senators had standing because their
votes were "overridden and virtually held for naught"); Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 703 (holding
U.S. Senators had standing where the President's action deprived them completely of vot-
ing opportunity); Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 436 (holding that a U.S. Senator had standing to
vindicate the effectiveness of his vote, which had been diminished by the use of a "pocket
veto"); cf. Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 (holding that U.S. Representatives lacked standing where
their votes on the bill at issue were given full effect).
235 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States	 .").
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laws. 236 In this situation, votes have truly been nullified and allowing
legislators to resort to the courts to seek relief is justified. 237
Where legislators' ability to make laws is in no way impaired, on
the other hand, their votes are not nullified regardless of how the ex-
ecutive branch enforces those laws. 238 That legislators have not been
denied the ability to vote on bills or pass legislation is important in
distinguishing the injury that signing statements cause from vote nul-
lification. 239 Even if a President refuses outright to enforce a law, this
refusal does not alter the fact that the law has been passed and re-
corded as a valid statute. 24° The fact that the statute exists is important
because it gives a private party who actually suffers an injury as a result of
its nonenforcement the right to bring a claim. 241
An example using one of President Bush's recent signing state-
ments is illustrative. 242 In 2002, in passing the Export-Import Bank Re-
2" See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438; Coldwater, 617 F.2d at 703; Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 436.
2" See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (granting standing where votes were "overridden and
virtually held for naught"); Coldwater, 617 F.2d at 703 (granting- standing where legislators
were denied completely of voting opportunity); Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 436 (granting stand-
ing where a vote was rendered meaningless by the use of a "pocket veto").
2-42 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824; Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22; Harrington, 553 F.2d at 211.
2" See Raine.s, 521 U.S. at 824 (nullification did not occur where legislators' votes had
been given full effect); Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22 (explaining that nullification does not oc-
cur whenever the government does something Congress voted against); Harrington, 553
F.2d at 211 (holding no nullification occurred where there was no claim that past votes
were denied full force and effect as a result of the CIA activities in question); Cooper, supra
note 162, at 516 (noting that signing statements are issued at the time a congressional
enactment is signed into law).
21° See, e.g., Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act Signing Statement, supra note
190 ("The executive branch shall carry out section 7(b) of the bill, which relates to certain
small businesses, in a manner consistent with the requirements of equal protection under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."). Despite the Presi-
dent's expressed intention not to enforce provisions of the Export-Import. Bank Reau-
thorization Act, those provisions still became law. See 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (E) (iii) (II)
(Stipp. III 2003) (requiring "emphasis on conducting outreach and increasing loans to
socially and economically disadvantaged small business concerns ... (and] small business
concerns ... owned by women").
241 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1974) (noting that "Congress may create a
statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue
even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence
of statute"); Trafficante v. Metro. Lite Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concur-
ring) (stating that in the absence of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 plaintiffs would not have
had standing to bring their case, but that the statute conferred standing upon them). But
see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992) (holding that the injury-in-fact
requirement was not satisfied by "congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract,
self-contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe the procedures re-
quired by law").
242 See Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act Signing Statement, supra note 190.
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authorization Act, Congress included a provision requiring that em-
phasis be placed on increasing loans to small businesses owned by
women. 245 In a signing statement, President Bush indicated his belief
that this provision violates the requirements of equal protection. 244 As-
suming that President Bush ignores this provision, and makes no effort
to increase loans to small businesses owned by women, legislators have
still been effective in passing this bil1. 245 As a result of the law's enact-
ment, someone who is injured by the President's action (for example, a
woman who has been unable to secure a loan for her small business)
could now bring suit on the basis that he is ignoring the law. 246 Such an
individual would likely have standing on the grounds that she has suf-
fered injury to an interest protected by the statute that the President is
ignoring. 247
Critics argue that in some situations there will be no private liti-
gant injured sufficiently to have standing and that members of Con-
gress should therefore be permitted to challenge a President's violation
of the law.248 The Court's statement in Raines, noting that its decision
does not foreclose a challenge by someone who actually suffers injury,
lends some support to the idea that the existence of other plaintiffs is
relevant.249 On other occasions, however, the Court has explicitly held
that "[t]he assumption that if [plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no
242 Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act § 7(b).
2" Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act Signing Statement, supra note 190.
242 See	 422 U.S. at 514; Trafficanie, 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring).
246 See Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-189, § 7(h),
116 Stat. 698, 700 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (E) (iii) (II) (Stipp, Ill
2003)); Mirth, 422 U.S. at 514; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring).
247 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (holding that standing requires the invasion of a legally
protected interest); Mirth, 422 U.S. at 514 (holding that existence of a statute can convert
an otherwise unprotected interest into a legally protected interest). The language in the
Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act may not be sufficient to confer standing because
it contains no explicit language of conferral. Sees 7(b); cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-72 (not-
ing that Endangered Species Act contained an explicit conferral of standing to "any per-
son"); Traffirante, 409 U.S. at 206 n.1 (noting that the Civil Rights Act contained an explicit
conferral of standing to "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice"). Congress, however, could easily remedy this by amending the law to
provide that anyone harmed by its violation could bring a claim in the federal courts. See
Traffirante, 409 U.S. at 206 n. 1.
2" See Senate !leafing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (testimony of Bruce
Fein); Exploring International Low, littp://explore.georgetown.edu/blogs/?id=17051  ( July
25, 2004, 04:14 EST) ("[I]t is possible that, unlike with the Line Item Veto Act there may
be no other possible plaintiffs. If that were the case, the Court might look more favorably on
granting federal legislator standing.").
249 See 521 U.S. at 829.
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one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing." 250 Where no
one is sufficiently injured to qualify for standing, the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers mandates that courts leave the dispute to be resolved
by the political process. 251
Because signing statements do not render legislators' votes mean-
ingless, they do not rise to the level of vote nullification. 252 When the
President signs a bill, it becomes law and members of Congress have
been able to exercise their legislative powers fully.253 Regardless of how
that law is enforced, legislators' votes have been given full effect and
nullification has not occurred. 254
B. The Separation of Powers as a Bar to Recognizing Institutional Injuries
Beyond Vole Nullification
Absent vote nullification, the question remains whether legislators
can still claim some other form of institutional injury sufficient to give
them standing. 255 Most potential challenges to presidential signing
statements can allege one of two injuries. 256 First, legislators can claim
that they, like all citizens, are injured by the President's refusal to corn-
2" Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974); see
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (stating that "the absence of any
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the
subject matter is committed ... ultimately to the political process").
45 ' See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227 (holding that a generalized grievance is insufficient
for standing and stating that "Mur system of government leaves many crucial decisions to
the political processes"); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
252 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 (holding no nullification occurred where legislators'
votes were given full effect); Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22 (explaining that nullification does not
occur whenever the government does something Congress voted against); Harrington, 553
F.2d at 211 (holding no nullification occurred where there was no claim that votes were
denied full force and effect).
455 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, ci. 2; see Raines, 821 U.S. at 825-26 (implying that legislators'
interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes does not extend beyond having
those votes counted and given full effect towards the passage of a bill).
254 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824; Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22; Harrington, 553 F.2d at 211.
255 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. Although Raines did not explicitly hold that vote nullifi-
cation is the only institutional injury that could give legislators standing, some have inter-
preted the decision as saying as much. See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 6, at 273 (noting
that after Raines, the D.C. Circuit "has seemed to acknowledge that a nullification of a vote
is the only basis for legislator standing").
256 See Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (protesting that "President.
Bush has employed signing statements to ignore or disobey more than 750 laws"); 152
Cot c.. REC. 58271 (daily ed. July 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (describing
signing statements as an "attempt to usurp legislative authority").
2007]	 Presidential Signing Statements e.? Legislator Standing 	 773
ply with the law.257 Second, legislators can claim that because of their
role in creating the laws, presidential signing statements diminish their
legislative power. 258 The Court has explicitly held that the latter injury
is insufficient for standing.259 The former injury is a quintessential gen-
eralized grievance that is, as this Section demonstrates, barred from the
federal courts by the separation of powers. 260
Legislator claims involving vote nullification are sufficient for
standing because the alleged injury affects legislators in a particularized
manner. 261 When legislators claim that the President is disobeying the
law through a signing statement, however, the injury they present is a
generalized grievance. 262 The harm from the President's action falls
equally on all citizens. 263 Furthermore, the Court has held that the bar
against generalized grievances is part of the constitutional requirement
for standing, meaning that it cannot be overcome by congressional
statute. 2' Senator Arlen Specter's bill proposing to grant standing to
members of Congress, if passed, would therefore be insufficient to give
legislators standing to challenge presidential signing statements. 265 In-
deed, the fact that the Line Item Veto Act in Raines attempted to grant
257 See Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (protesting that "President
Bush has employed signing statements to ignore or disobey more than 750 laws").
258 See 152 CO G. REC. S8271 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (describing signing
statements as an "attempt to usurp legislative authority").
259 See. Raines, 521 U.S. at 821,830 (holding that diminution of legislative power is an
injury insufficient for standing).
2° See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 315 (Ratidolph, J., concurring) (stating that the argument
that "[w]e, the members of Congress, have standing because the President violated one of
our laws" raises serious separation of powers concerns); Harrington, 553 F.2d at 213-14
(holding that a U.S. Representative lacked standing because his alleged injury resulting
from the executive branch's illegal activity fell equally on all citizens, and therefore consti-
tuted a generalized grievance about the conduct of government (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at
106)).
281 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (stating that an injury must be particularized to be sufficient
for standing); see Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (implying that vote nullification is sufficiently
particularized to give legislators standing).
262 See Senate Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 4 (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the judiciary) ("President Bush has em-
ployed signing statements to ignore or disobey more than 750 laws."); Savage, supra note
161 (describing George W. Bush's signing statements as claimed authority to disobey laws).
26 See Harrington, 553 E2d at 213-14 (holding that a U.S. Representative lacked stand-
ing because his claimed injury resulting from illegal activity by the executive branch fell
equally on all citizens, and therefore constituted a generalized grievance about the con-
duct of government (quoting Has& 392 U.S. at 106)).
254 Lupin, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
255 See Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006).
774	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 48:739
standing to members of Congress was insufficient to overcome the con-
stitutional requirements for standing. 266
Legislators attempting to challenge signing statements, like other
plaintiffs raising a generalized grievance, should not be granted stand-
ing in the federal courts due to the doctrine of separation of powers. 267
The concern with such a claim is not that Congress is attempting to in-
trude on the executive branch, but rather that by hearing a claim of
this nature, the courts would be intruding on both of the political
branches.268 The Court's statements on numerous occasions that the
doctrine of standing's primary purpose is to limit the role of the courts
in a democratic society reflect this concern. 269
Hearing cases involving a generalized grievance violates the doc-
trine of separation of powers because it requires the federal courts to
step in to protect the rights of the majority. 270 As the only undemo-
cratic branch of the federal government, the role of the courts is to
protect the rights of individuals. 271 Vindicating the public interest, on
the other hand, is the function of the President and Congress as
popularly elected branches of government. 272 Not only is vindicating
the public interest the job of the political branches, but it is also a role
for which the courts are particularly ill-suited. 273
A challenge to signing statements brought by legislators demon-
strates why the federal courts should not resolve disputes involving
generalized grievances. 274 When the President disobeys a law (after ex-
286 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3.
267 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1983); Scalia, su-
pra note 19, at 894.
268 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77; see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 819-20 (stating that "our
standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute
would force us to decide whether action taken by one of the other two branches of the
Federal Government was unconstitutional").
268 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 ("[T] he law of Art, III standing is built on a single basic
idea—the idea of separation of powers,"); Worth, 422 U.S. at 498 (stating that standing "is
founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a de-
mocratic society"); see also Lilian, 504 U.S. at 559-60 (describing standing as the mecha-
nism by which the role of the courts is limited and the separation of powers maintained).
2" See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77; Scalia, supra note 19, at 894.
271 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170
(1803)); Scalia, supra note 19, at 894.
272 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
273 Scalia, supra note 19, at 896 (explaining that the courts have "in a way been specifi-
cally designed to be bad at [protecting the rights of the majority]--selected from the aris-
tocracy of the highly educated, instructed to be governed by a body of knowledge that
values abstract principle above concrete result . . . and removed from all accountability to
the electorate").
274 See. Lujan, 504 U,S. at 576-77; Scalia, supra note 19, at 894.
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pressing his intent to do so in a signing statement), his actions poten-
tially harm either the majority of citizens or a minority group. 275 A dial-
lenge brought by legislators does not involve an injury to themselves as
a minority group, but rather represents an attempt to utilize the federal
courts to protect what they perceive to be an interest of a majority of
citizens—an interest in having the President obey the law. 276 Granting
standing to legislators is inappropriate because the majority interest
they arc asserting is protected through the political process—if a major-
ity of citizens disapprove of the President's actions, they can vote him or
her out of office. 277
Where only a minority group is injured, however, the political
process does not adequately protect its rights. 278 Accordingly, indi-
viduals who are injured by the President's signing statement will have
standing to challenge that action in the federal courts. 279
This dynamic is demonstrated by the litigation over the Line Item
Veto Act of 1996. 280 Following the dismissal of a suit brought by legisla-
tors for lack of standing in Raines, 281 the Supreme Court in 1998 in Clin-
ton v. City of New York granted standing to a group of plaintiffs who had
suffered direct economic injury as a result of the President's use of the
Line Item Veto. 282 Unlike the legislators in Raines, these plaintiffs were
not asserting harm to a majority interest but rather harm to a minority
interest that justified the involvement of the judicial branch . 283
278 See, e.g., Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act Signing Statement, supra
note 194. President Bush's signing statement regarding the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 could he seen as potentially harming majority or minority interests. See id. By reserv-
ing the right to use certain methods )1' torture, this signing statement potentially injures
the minority group comprised of detainees who might now be subject to such torture. See
id. His ignoring this statute could also be seen as harming a majority interest if a majority
of citizens desire that the U.S. military not engage in certain forms of interrogation be-
cause they believe it is cruel or damaging to the reputation of the United States. See id.
-276 See Scalia, supra note 19, at 894.
277 See Lupin, 504 U.S. at 576.
278 See Scalia, supra note 19, at 895.
275 See Lupin, 504 U.S. at 576.
sea see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,421 (1998); Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
251 521 U.S. at 830.
2"2
	
U.S. at 430.
283 See id.; Raines, 521 U.S. at 829-30 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
192 (1966)).
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C. An Argument for Standing Where a Presidential Signing Statement
Deprives Legislators of Information to Which They Are Entitled
Although signing statements never reach the level of vote nullifica-
tion 284 and the majority of legislator claims amount to nothing more
than generalized grievances, 285 there is at least one possible circum-
stance where a presidential signing statement sufficiently injures mem-
bers of Congress to give them standing in the federal courts. 288 Where
the President's refusal to obey the law deprives legislators of informa-
tion to which they are entitled, they suffer an injury that is concrete
and particularized, and therefore adequate for standing. 287
An example of this scenario is illustrated by the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (the "Act") and the
President's signing statement in response. 288 In the Act, Congress re-
quired the Inspector General of the Department of justice (the "DO-J")
to conduct audits of the DOD's use of Patriot Act provisions and report
the results of these audits to certain committees of Congress. 289 In a
signing statement, President Bush responded that he would construe
the Act "in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional au-
thority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold in-
formation the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, na-
tional security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the per-
formance of the Executive's constitutional duties."29° Essentially,
President Bush suggested that he was not required to comply with the
Act to the extent that it required the executive branch to provide cer-
tain information to Congress. 291
Although a refusal to provide Congress with information does not
nullify those legislators' votes, 292 it nonetheless injures them in a con-
crete and particularized Way. 293 The Court has never granted legislators
284 See supra notes 227-254 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 255-283 and accompanying text.
286 See Patriot Act Signing Statement, supra note 188.
281 See id.
288 See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, §§ 106A, 119, 120 Stat. 192, 201-02, 219-21 (2006); Patriot Act. Signing Statement,
supra note 188,
288 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act §§ 106A, 119.
290 Patriot Act Signing Statement, supra note 188.
281 See id.
282 See supra notes 227-254 and accompanying text.
285 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 5130 (holding that injury sufficient for standing requires con-
crete and particularized harm); Wirth, 422 U.S. at 508 (holding that plaintiff "must allege
specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him" to qualify
for standing).
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standing for an institutional injury other than vote nullification, but it
has also never explicitly held that no other injury is sufficient.294 There-
fore, President Bush's Patriot Act signing statement (or a similar sign-
ing statement) presents an opportunity for legislator standing, and
members of Congress who desire to challenge the practice of issuing
signing statements should bring a claim based on this type of signing
statement.295
Despite amounting to less than nullification, the injury to legisla-
tors caused by such a signing statement is distinguishable from the in-
jury in Raines that was found insufficient for standing. 296 As explained,
an interpretation of Raines that rests on the distinction between per-
sonal and official injury is unsustainable. 297 The Raines Court also de-
clined to hold that the injury at issue was distinguishable from Coleman
v. Miller on the grounds that that case involved state legislators. 298 Raines
is thus best understood as hOlding that diminution of legislative power
is an injury insufficient for standing because, unlike vote nullification,
it is "wholly abstract and widely dispersed."299
The injury to members of Congress that the President's Patriot
Act Reauthorization signing statement causes, unlike the "diminution
294 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 823 (holding that legislators lacked standing where their
votes were not nullified but not foreclosing the possibility that other injuries could be suf-
ficient); Alexander, supra note 6, at 698 (arguing that injuries other than nullification are
sufficient to give legislators standing). But see Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 6, at 273 (stat7
ing that "the D.C. Circuit has seemed to acknowledge that nullification of a vote is the wily
basis for legislator standing").
295 See Patriot Act Signing Statement, supra note 188. Legislators would still have to
overcome the obstacle of ripeness. See supra note 216. For a challenge to this signing
statement to he ripe, the President (or Department of justice) would actually have to with-
hold information from members of Congress in accordance with President gush's signing
statement. See supra note 216.
296 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (describing the plaintiffs' injury as "wholly abstract and
widely dispersed").
297 See Standing in the 1.1fay, supra note 151, at 1749 ("Commentators ... agree that
'tithe allowance of suit in an official capacity is commonplace in American jurispru-
dence.'" (quoting TRIBE, supra note 23, § 3-20, at 150)); see also Leading Cases, supra note
152, at 222 n.47 (noting that prior to Raines "the Court primarily had employed the per-
sonal injury requirement to ensure that the alleged injury was particularized, and not to
distinguish between personal- and official-capacity injuries").
296 Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8.
299 See id, at 829; cf. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438. Nullification of a specific vote is a more
concrete and tangible injury than diminution of legislative power, and nullification injures
only a particular class of legislators—those legislators whose votes, if given full effect,
would have been sufficient to achieve a desired legislative result. See Leading Gases, supra
note 152, at 223 (explaining that the vote nullification in Coleman is distinguishable from
Raines because it presents an injury that is more concrete).
778	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 48:739
of legislative power" in Raines, is concrete and particularized. 3°0 This
injury does not fall on all members of Congress, but rather only on a
discrete group of members on select committees. 301 The injury cannot
therefore be characterized as "widely dispersed." 302 Additionally, this
signing statement injures these specific members of Congress by de-
priving them of reports to which they are entiticd. 303 Unlike the dimi-
nution of legislative power, such an injury is not "wholly abstract" but
rather tangible and concrete.304
Furthermore, much like vote nullification, when legislators are
deprived of information, the harm they suffer is not a majoritarian
harm and is not adequately protected by the political process. 306 The
effects of the President's refusal to obey the Patriot Act would not fall
equally on all citizens but rather would uniquely affect members of
Congress who arc denied information. 306
Some would argue that this is still a majoritarian harm because
legislators are only representatives of the people, and therefore any in-
jury they suffer in their role as legislators is actually harm to all citi-
zens.307 Although this reasoning seems logical, the same argument
3°° See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829; Patriot Act Signing Statement, supra note 188.
3° 1 See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, §§ 106A, 119, 120 Stat. 192, 201-02, 219-21 (2006) (requiring the Inspector General
of the Department of justice to provide audits to the Committee on the judiciary and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on the judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate).
302 Cf. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (describing an injury that falls on all members of Con-
gress as "widely dispersed").
303 See Patriot Act Signing Statement, supra note 188.
3°4 Cf. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (describing diminution of legislative power as a "wholly
abstract" injury).
3°3 See Scalia, supra note 19, at 895.
306 See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act §§ 106A, 119; cf. Harling-
ton, 553 F.2d at 213-14 (holding that harm that is shared by all citizens is insufficient fbr
standing). The facts in Harrington v. Bush closely resemble the proposed challenge to the
Patriot Act signing statement, but with important differences. See Harrington, 553 F.2d at
195. In Harlington a legislator claimed that he was denied information about the receipts
and expenditures of the CIA to which he was statutorily entitled. Id. Although the court
denied standing, a crucial difference lies in the fact that in Harrington, Congress had en-
acted a specific exception for CIA appropriations. Id. Only members of the Subcommittee
on Intelligence of the House Appropriations Committee were entitled to the information
about CIA appropriations, and therefore Congressman Harrington really had no claim
that he was entitled to this information at all. See id.
3°7 See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as
moot, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (arguing that because members of Congress hold their office in
trust for their constituents, it is impossible that a legislator could have standing to sue in
his official capacity fur an injury that would not give standing to any of his or her constitu-
ents); Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
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would apply equally to vote nullification." The harm that legislators
suffer as the result of vote nullification can similarly be characterized as
an injury to constituents , who have had their representative power in
government diminished."9 The Court's rejection of this argument with
regard to vote nullification indicates that it recognizes that some inju-
ries to legislators in their official capacity can be considered harms to
minority interests requiring the protection of the courts.so
If members of Congress are serious about having the federal courts
entertain cases involving signing statements, a challenge to President
Bush's Patriot Act Reauthorization signing statement (or a similar sign-
ing statement) presents the best opportunity. 3 " A challenge to this
signing statement cannot be easily dismissed as a generalized grievance
like many other challenges." Even though legislators would not be
claiming an injury of vote nullification, denial of information presents
a concrete and particularized injury of such a similar nature that it can
support a claim of standing. 313
CONCLUSION
Challenges to presidential signing statements introduce a new
wrinkle to the complex doctrine of legislator standing. At first glance,
these claims do not appear to fit neatly into either the category of cases
where standing has been granted or into those where it has explicitly
J., concurring) (arguing that legislators "wield those powers not as private citizens but only
through the public office which they hold," and therefore should never be granted stand-
ing for injuries to their legislative powers).
"H See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 50 (Bork, J., dissenting); Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Frankfurter made this argument in his separate opinion in Coleman.
307 U.S. at 470 (Frankfurter, J.) (stating that claims of vote nullification "pertain to legisla-
tors not as individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative process" and
"Pin no sense are they matters of 'private damage'").
309 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 470 (Frankfurter, J.); Barnes, 759 F.2d at 50 (Bork, J., dis-
senting); Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring).
310 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (majority opinion) (holding that senators' "plain, di-
rect, and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes" is sufficient to
give them standing in the federal courts); Scalia, supra note 19, at 894 (stating that the role
of the courts is to protect individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority);
see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 832 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that as a factual matter,
legislators have a more direct and tangible interest in the preservation of their legislative
power than the general citizenry); Standing in the Way, „WPM note 151, at 1749 (noting that
representatives can have interests different from the interests of their constituents).
311 See Patriot Act Signing Statement, supra note 188.
312 Cf. Harrington, 553 F.2d at 213-14 (holding that a legislator claim that the executive
branch is acting illegally constitutes a generalized grievance).
513 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438; if. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.
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been rejected. A closer look at the justifications for granting or denying
legislators standing, however, reveals that in almost all circumstances
signing statements do not result in an injury sufficient to give legislators
standing. Absent vote nullification, almost any claim that legislators
could bring would constitute a generalized grievance. Conferring
standing on legislators in these circumstances would violate the separa-
tion of powers.
Despite this, the fact that vote nullification has been held sufficient
to give legislators standing opens the door for recognition of other in-
juries—in particular, the deprivation of information to which legislators
are statutorily entitled. The President has claimed the authority to dis-
obey laws that require the executive branch to share information with
Congress. If he follows through with this assertion, legislators who wish
to challenge him may succeed in having their day in court.
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